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A whole acreage base buy-out is proposed as a means of eliminating price 
and income supports in agriculture. Buy-out payments for acreage bases equal 
to projected 1986-1990 costs for current programs would substantially improve 
U.s. cost competitiveness and reduce future government outlays without making 
recipients worse off. 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY: 
A PROPOSED WHOLE ACREAGE BASE BUY-oUT 
Introduction 
Farm commodity price and income support programs come under frequent 
attack. Criticism ranges from arguments that government expenditures 
substantially exceed the net benefits received by producers to arguments that 
the programs are perverse and self-defeating. 
Alternatives to current programs have been and continue to be proposed. 
Proposals range from "fine tuning" such as tinkering with loan rates and/or 
target prices to such things as mandatory production or marketing quotas. 
Nearly every list of alternatives includes a "no program" or a "free market" 
option (see [13] for example). Indeed, the rhetoric of the Reagan 
Administration appears to indorse such an option as this administration's 
preferred course of action. [6] 
Most arguments for the "no program" option are based on the concept of 
economic efficiency in a social welfare context. That is, they are based on 
the first best view that, all else equal, less government intervention in the 
market is preferable to more: none preferable to some. 
Begging the merits of such a first best argument in a second best world, 
the "no program" option seldom gets pushed beyond a recognition that some type 
of a transition program would be needed to help those who currently receive 
benefits (payments, loans, etc.) adjust to program termination. Much 
discussion has occurred regarding such things as how the transition should be 
made, how long the transition period ought to be, how much compensation should 
be paid, ad nausea. The objectives of the "no program" option often get lost 
in the details of transition. 
Our purpose in this paper is to present an alternative to the transition 
approach: "cold turkey". That is, we propose termination of commodity price 
and income programs with no transition. But, a one-time payment would be made 
to compensate the owners of claims to future income streams that are 
associated with the terminated programs. With this proposal, there would be 
no choice, no options--the programs would be eliminated and those who were 
entitled to program benefits would receive a lump-sum payment. 
It is our contention that this approach has the potential to: (1) 
sharply reduce future government outlays on agricultural commodity programs 
while making producers no worse off, (2) enhance the cost competitiveness of 
U.S. agricultural products in international markets, and (3) remove some 
second best constraints to societal welfare optimization. We offer some 
analysis to support the first two contentions, but leave the third to be 
accepted as an article of faith. 
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The Basic Concept 
Our discussion herewithin is limited to corn, wheat, sorghum, rice and 
cotton, with our most detailed analysis offered for the first two. With more 
data, it could be expanded to other crops for which there are federal price 
and income supports. Conjecturally, it could also be extended to commodities 
for which there are only price support programs (e.g. milk, soybeans) and 
quota schemes (e.g. tobacco, peanuts) but we have not yet identified all of 
the necessary nuances. 
We call this proposal a whole acreage base buy-out. For commodities 
involving federal price and income supports, eligibility for program benefits 
is tied to established acreage bases. Without such a base, a producer cannot 
receive price support loans or deficiency and diversion payments. Thus, if 
the owner of the land upon which a base has been established loses that base, 
the right to receive program benefits is also lost. 
Our proposal is to end these commodity programs by revoking the acreage 
bases. Owners would not lose the right to use the land, only the right to 
receive program benefits (loans and payments). Regulations on the use of the 
land would be reduced, if not eliminated entirely, because acreage set asides 
and diversions would no longer be required and there would be no base to be 
maintained by planting program crops, cross compliances and similar 
requirements. In essence, there would be no restrictions on land use from 
federal commodity programs per !!• Soil and water conservation programs, 
local land use restrictions and the like, however, would not be affected. 
In return for giving up the right to a future stream of government 
benefits (i.e. the acreage base), owners of those bases would receive a one-
time cash payment. That is, the acreage base would be bought back by the 
federal government for a lump sum price. Thus, entitlement to benefits in the 
commodity programs would be converted from a flow of payments, loans, etc. 
throughout future years to a single capital transfer at the time of the buy-
out. At least conceptually, this payment would reimburse base owners for the 
current value of the time-discounted flow of future (but uncertain) benefits. 
Thus, owners sho~ld be indifferent, all else equal. 
It is generally accepted that much of the economic gain to commodity 
program participation has been capitalized into the value of the land that 
holds the qualifying acreage base (see [11] for example). Obviously, with no 
program, the present value of that land asset would decline. The proposed 
one-tir.e capital payment is to compensate owners of these assets for this 
depreciation in value. Owners could invest the capital payment in other 
income-earning a s~ts and/or r~tj,t land debt. 1n either case, the earnings 
that would have to be received from the land ln order ftr the base owner to be 
no worse off than before would be reduced by the equivalent of the savings on 
debt service costs and/or earnings from alternative investments. Thus 
(assuming an efficient land transfer and rental market), the effective cost of 
using this land for crop production would be reduced by like amount. 
The potential benefits of this proposal are manifold. First, it would 
remove a major source of government interventions in the market for these 
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commodities, thus removing some impediments to economic efficiency in a 
societal welfare context. Second, it would eliminate future government 
expenditures on these commodity programs. While outlays in the year that the 
buy-out occurs would increase by the amount that the one-time payments exceed 
annual program costs, thereafter there would be no further outlays. Third, 
producer uncertainty over the future flow of benefits from the commodity 
programs due to unpredictable program changes would be eliminated. Fourth, 
future production costs for these commodities would be lowered due to the 
lower land costs, thus enhancing cost competitiveness of U.S. producers in 
world markets. 
Payments 
Essential to determining the size of one-time payments for the commodity 
acreage bases is an assessment of the impacts of current program benefits on 
land values. Programs have been directed at increasing income and reducing 
risk experienced by participating crop farmers. This has generated an 
expectation of a higher income stream from land in the programs (i.e. with 
acreage bases) at a lower level of risk than in the absence of such programs. 
These expectations have made land a relatively secure and attractive 
investment, and much of the gain has been capitalized into land values. 
During the 1960's net farm income trended generally downward, compared to 
the steadily increasing farm in real estate values. Following the income boom 
and bust in the early 1970's land values continued to trend upward, then 
lagging the decline in income by 7 or 8 years (Figure #1). Land rents, in 
general, have followed trends in land values (Figure #2). Farm land owners, 
therefore, rather than farm operators appear to have been the main 
beneficiaries from the commodity programs as well as from favorable market 
developments. 
Melichar has shown that government programs do not alter the total 
required rate of return but rather the composition of the return [11]. The 
required rate of return is essentially the opportunity cost associated with 
alternative investments. He gives an example of a required rate of return of 
5 percent from a given asset (e.g. land). Assuming an efficient market, and 
no increase in asset values, the asset will be priced such that its income 
stream will yield a 5 percent return. Put another way, it will sell at 20 
times its earnings. If the expected increase in earnings from the asset is 3 
percent per year, the value of the asset will also increase by 3 percent 
annually. This leaves a 2 percent return to be generated from income in order 
to achieve the 5 percent total rate of return. Thus, the asset will be priced 
at 50 times earnings. 
A one time acreage base buy-out would reapportion returns toward income 
and away from capital appreciation. Land values would be expected to decline 
to levels that would generate the required rate of return based on the income 
expected without government program benefits. Assume (as in this example) 
that before the buy-out the 5 percent required rate of return consisted of 2 
percent income return and 3 percent real capital appreciation. Assume that 
after the buy-out, expected income growth is reduced to 1 percent and thus, 
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real capital appreciation is also reduced to 1 percent annually. This leaves 
a needed return of 4 percent attributed to income. The land would have to be 
priced at 25 times income. That means that land that was previously priced at 
$1,000/acre based on an income stream of $20/year would now be priced at 
$500/acre. The acreage base buy-out payment would compensate the land owner 
for the depreciation in land value. 
For the purposes of this analysis, we are somewhat arbitrarily fixing the 
one-time buy-out payment for wheat, corn, sorghum, rice and cotton base acres 
equivalent to a pro-rata share of the total projected outlays for these 
commodity programs between FY 1986 and FY 1990, as provided in the Food 
Security Act of 1985 (FSA). These expenditures are estimated at $19.67 
billion for wheat, $35.77 billion for corn, $3.74 billion for sorghum, $4.28 
billion for rice and $10.33 billion for cotton [9 & 13]. Where divided by the 
number of base acres for these commodities that existed in 1986, these outlays 
average $215, $434, $200, $1,019, and $725 per base acre of wheat, corn, 
sorghum, rice, and cotton, respectively. 
We use these averages as buy-out payments for each respective commodity. 
Thus, total government outlays for the proposed buy-out would be the same as 
what they would be for these commodity programs over the five year duration of 
the FSA. Essentially, one could view this as an acceleration of existing 
commitments in order to eliminate all subsequent commitments. These payments 
would not have to be equal for all base acres of each commodity but could be 
weighted according to established yields in order to reflect differences in 
land quality. For example, if the average established yield on all corn base 
acres was 100 bushels/acre, then the buy-out payment for a base acre with a 
120 bushel established yield could be put at 120 percent of the $434 average, 
and so on. 
While a conceptually more appealing method of calculating the size of 
one-time payments would be to base them on a discounted present value of an 
entire future stream of government program benefits, we opt for the simpler 
calculation, above. There are two reasons: first, the entire future stream 
of program benefits is not known due to political and economic uncertainty, 
and second, our method has the political appeal of costing no more ~han what 
is already committed under current law. 
Impacts 
One important factor affecting the effectiveness of a base buy-out is the 
efficiency in which land rents reflect changes in land values. It has already 
been shown that cabh rents and la1d values ge~er1Lly move in the same 
direction but not necessarilJ at Lb~ same ratd ~~~gure 2). Reasons include 
leases that effectively span more than one year and uncertain perceptions of 
owners and operators as to the duration and extent of changes in land market 
values (rental market inefficiencies). An important impact of the buy-out to 
producers is lowering land cost as a factor of production. Since about one-
half of the land currently cropped is rented, land rents as well as values 
need to efficiently reflect the buy-out payment. In order to reduce any 
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tendency of lag, the policy would have to be enacted quickly and decisively, 
convincing the industry of its finality. 
One of the potential benefits of a complete base buy-out is to increase 
the cost competitiveness of u.s. farm commodities in export markets. 
Currently available data suggest that the u.s. is not cost-competitive 
relative to such important export competitors as Thailand, Argentina and South 
Africa for corn and Argentina, Canada and Australia for wheat. 
Land is an important component of cost comparative competitiveness [12]. 
A study done by Ortmann, Stulp and Rask (OSR) concludes that "fertilizer, 
general overhead, capital replacement and land costs are the main factors 
giving rise to overall cost differences" between the u.s. and major 
competitors in international markets. The OSR estimates of land, nonland and 
total costs for producing corn and wheat in the u.s. and four major competing 
countries are shown in table 1. These data show that for corn, u.s. land and 
total production costs are exceeded only by Brazil and are almost double those 
of Thailand. For wheat, the u.s. has a cost disadvantage compared to two 
major competitors and is roughly equal to a third, Canada. Unfortunately for 
our purposes, OSR did not extend their analysis to sorghum, rice or cotton. 
Table 1: Production Costs a/ for Wheat 
(per metric ton, expressed in 
rates.) 
Corn 
Cost/Ton Argentina Brazil 
Land Charge b/ $13.97 $34.65 
Nonland $71.25 $113.73 
Total Production $85.22 $148.38 
Wheat 
Cost/Ton Argentina Brazil 
Land Charge b/ $15.55 $33.75 
Non land $67.05 $269.40 
Total Production $82.60 $303.15 
and Corn in Various Countries 
u.s. dollars at mid-1986 exchange 
s. Africa 
$17.41 
$90.73 
$108.14 
Australia 
$25.55 
$93.92 
$119.47 
Thailand 
$11.82 
$67.34 
$79.16 
Canada 
$37.92 
$124.41 
$162.33 
u.s. 
$22.48 
$96.74 
$119.22 
u.s. 
$26.67 
$132.81 
$159.48 
a/ Production costs for each country are representative of one or more years 
in the 1979-85 period depending on data available for the specific 
country, adjusted for inflation. 
b/ 1985 land costs. 
Source: [ 12] 
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Lower average land costs in the u.s. as a result of asset depreciation 
under the proposed acreage base buy-out would enhance the ability of u.s. corn 
and wheat growers to be more cost competitive. The average cropland value in 
the plains states in 1986 was $384/acre and in the cornbelt, $932/acre. Using 
these as representative of current average values for wheat and corn land~ 
one-time buy-out payments of $215 and $434, respectively, would reduce wheat 
land costs by an average of 56 percent (215/384) and corn land costs by an 
average of 47 percent (434/932). 
The comparative cost data shown in Table 1 are repeated in Table 2, with 
average u.s. land costs for corn and wheat reduced by 47 percent and 56 
percent, respectively. This simulates, albeit imperfectly, the potential 
impact of the one-time buy-out payment on the effective cost of land as a 
production factor. Average u.s. production costs decline 9.4 percent for 
wheat and 8.9 percent for corn. For corn, this would put total u.s. 
production costs at about the same level as those for one major competitor, 
South Africa, who otherwise enjoys nearly a 10 percent cost advantage, and 
reduces the cost disadvantage vis-a-vis the two lowest cost competitors, 
Thailand and Argentina, by 26 percent and 31 percent, respectively. For 
wheat, the u.s. would gain an 11% cost advantage relative to Canada and its 
cost disadvantages relative to Argentina and Australia would decrease by 19 
percent and 37 percent, respectively. 
Cost 
Table 2: Production Costs a/for Wheat and Corn in Various Countries with 
u.s. Land Costs Adjusted for acreage Base Buy-out Payments (per 
metric ton, expressed in U.S. dollars at mid-1986 exchange 
rates.) 
Corn 
Argentina Brazil s. Africa Thailand u.s. 
Land Charge $13.97 $34.65 $17.41 $11.82 $12.01 
Nonland $71.25 $113.73 $90.73 $67.34 $96.74 
Total Production $85.22 $148.38 $108.14 $79.16 $108.75 
7 
Wheat 
Argentina Brazil Australia Canada u.s. 
Cost 
Land Charge b/ $15.55 $33.75 $25.55 $37.92 $11.73 
Non land $67.05 $269.40 $93.92 $124.41 $132.81 
Total Production $82.60 $303.15 $119.47 $162.33 $144.54 
a/ 
b/ 
Production costs for each country are representative of one or more years 
in the 1979-85 period depending on data available for the specific 
country, adjusted for inflation. 
1985 land costs for all countries except U.S. which is adjusted for 
acreage base buy-out payments. Calculations for u.s. land costs are: 
Corn: $434 payment = .47 
$932 avg. land value 
$22.48 - ($22.48 X .47) = $12.01 
Wheat: $215 payment = .56 
$384 avg. land value 
$26.67 - ($26.67 X .56)= $11.73 
Obviously, this analysis assumes that a change of this magnitude in u.s. 
costs of production would have no impact on foreign costs, which is doubtful. 
In reality, such a change would be expected to exert downward pressure on land 
costs in competing countries, thus reducing the net competitive cost gains for 
the U.S. An assessment of such "spillover" effects would be insightful. 
Nonetheless, it does seem reasonably clear that the relative cost position of 
u.s. producers would be improved. 
Another type of comparison is to approximate the effect of lower land 
costs on u.s. commodity prices relative to those of some major competitors. 
Recent prices for the u.s. and some of its competitors for wheat, corn, rice 
and cotton are shown in Table 3. Land cost reductions for sorghum, rice and 
cotton of 43 percent, 95 percent and 81 percent, respectively, are arrived at 
in the same way as for corn and wheat in Table 2. The u.s. "before" and 
"after" prices in Table 3 show these cost reductions, directly reflected as 
changes in absolute values of u.s. f.o.b. prices. In the case of rice, u.s. 
prices would fall from the highest to the lowest, compared to Burma and 
Thailand. For cotton, the u.s. price would fall below its major competitor 
(USSR) and distance itself further from Turkey and Egypt. In wheat the u.s. 
price would fall well below Australia and close to that of Argentina. For 
corn the u.s. price would fall to the bottom of the price ladder against a 
major competitor. 
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While methodologically these latter comparisons suffer even more than do 
the earlier cost comparisons, they do provide insight into the magnitudes of 
competitive pressures that the u.s. could generate in world markets. 
Another potential advantage of the proposed acreage base buy-out is the 
reduction of future federal government outlays on farm programs. The buy-out 
Table 3: 1985 Pricesa/ for Wheat, Corn, Rice and Sorghum and 1982-83 
Prices for Cotton in Various Countries, Expressed in u.s. 
Dollars at the Exchange Rates for that Current Year. 
$/MT Rice Cotton Wheat Corn Sorghum 
Burma 67.4 
* * * * 
Thailand 74.1 
* * * * 
USSR * 1565 * * * 
Turkey * 1840 * * * 
Egypt * 2427 * * * 
Argentina 
* * 
135 132 
* 
Australia * * 153 * * 
Canada 
* * 
166 
* * 
u.s.-before 76.3 1662 153 138 119 
-after 48.0 1487 138 129 110 
:! Prices for respective commodities are f.o.b. or wholesale depending on 
availability of data. 
* 
Not available 
Source: compiled from [2 1' [5], [10]. 
of corn and wheat base acres as ana 1 yzed herein would be a "wash" for 
government outlays during the five year period currently covered by the FSA of 
1985, given the way that we calculated the size of the payments. Clearly, the 
distribution of outlays would be accelerated within the five year period. 
Equally clear, however, is a high probability that commodity programs will be 
continued in some form beyond 1990 in the absence of something along the lines 
of the proposed buy-out. What the future cost of such programs would be is 
not known. 
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Total outlays for the final year of the FSA, 1990, on wheat and corn 
programs alone are currently estimated at roughly $9 billion. If we assume 
the same level of annual expenditures for each of the following 5 and 10 
years, elimination of these programs would total to $45 and $90 billion, 
respectively, in nominal dollar savings. If discounted at 7 percent, the 
present value of such savings would be about $32 and $46 billion, 
respectively. Obviously, if the buy-out was extended to other commodities, 
direct savings in future government outlays would be even more significant. 
Further, elimination of these commodity programs would substantially reduce 
the private costs associated with uncertainty over future benefit levels and 
with political action to affect such levels. 
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